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Abstract
We show that very little is needed to create liquidity under-supply
in equilibrium. Credit constraints on demand by themselves can cause
an under-supply of liquidity, without the uncertainty, intermediation,
asymmetric information or complicated international financial framework used in other models in the literature. We show that the undersupply is a non-monotone function of the demand distortion that causes
it, a result that may have interesting implications for emerging markets
economies. Finally, when we make the credit constraint endogenous,
the inefficiency can be large due to the presence of a multiplier.
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Introduction

Liquidity has been defined in many different ways. We will adopt two definitions of liquidity, which we call Physical Liquidity and Financial Liquidity.
They refer to the flexibility to move physical goods (money) across different projects (investments). The goal of this paper is to explain liquidity
under-supply in equilibrium: when firms, in a decentralized way, optimally
choose their own liquidity positions, the economy as a whole ends up with
less liquidity than the second best efficient level.
∗
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There are already many explanations in the literature for the liquidity under supply phenomenon. For Holmstrom–Tirole (1998), liquidity is
related to how complete the asset markets are, and in particular, with the
ability of the private sector to buy a riskless asset in order to transfer wealth
across time. With this definition, they get under-supply of liquidity in the
presence of aggregate uncertainty. (If the only tradable security is assumed
to be shares in aggregate production, the riskless asset will be missing.) For
Kiyotaki–Moore (2000), liquidity is money, and they obtain liquidity shortages in equilibrium in an infinite horizon economy under non-saleability
assumptions. For Morris–Shin (2003), liquidity is the thickness of markets
and they use global games techniques to show how liquidity under-provision
can arise from asymmetric information. There is a big literature, including
Diamond-Rajan (2001) and Chang–Velasco (1999), in which liquidity shortages and crises arise from bank intermediation and failures. For Geanakoplos
(2003), liquidity declines when lenders endogenously raise margin requirements. Finally, Caballero–Krishnamurthy (2001) argue that liquidity under
provision is a characteristic of emerging market economies. They work in
a model with two different liquidities (a domestic and an international),
idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty, and credit constraints in both domestic and international markets.
In this paper, we use a simple model to show that a sufficient condition to
get liquidity under-supply is the presence of credit constraints on demand. In
particular, we do not need any kind of uncertainty, asymmetric information,
intermediation or a complicated international financial framework to prove
the result. Our model also shows that the aggregate under-supply of liquidity
is not necessarily a characteristic of emerging market economies, since the
inefficiency can arise in mature markets as well, as long as there are credit
constraints.
The liquidity under-supply we describe is a particular example of a more
general principle that we call the Offsetting Distortions principle. This principle states that a distortion in demand for any good can often be understood
as an inefficiency of supply, even though the demanders are completely different from the suppliers. In our model, credit constraints play the role of
demand distortions, which, as the Offsetting Distortion principle suggests,
can be understood as an inefficiency in the supply of liquidity.
Next, we explore the relationship between the liquidity under-supply
and the demand distortion that creates it. We find that the liquidity undersupply is a non-monotone function of the credit constraint. If we interpret
the credit constraint as the degree of financial development in the economy, our second proposition states that the liquidity under-supply is a non2

monotone function of the degree of financial development. This suggests
that when financial markets are very undeveloped, financial innovation may
paradoxically make government intervention (like taxation of illiquid investments) more necessary. It is difficult not to think about the financial innovation and simultaneous, dramatic, reduction of government participation
in financial markets that took place in Latin American economies during
the 90s. Numerous liquidity crises occurred in these economies during that
period. The non-monotonicity occurs for any commodity if we suppose that
the central planner can affect only part of the supply curve: Second Best
inefficiency is then a non-monotone function of the demand distortion. The
nature of liquidity as flexibility insures that the central planner can indeed
only affect part of the supply curve, thus linking liquidity with non-monotone
distortions.
In the last part of the paper we think about the magnitude of the liquidity
under-supply. We model the credit constraint by assuming that borrowers
will default unless their promises are covered by collateral. Further, we assume that only an exogenous proportion β of one durable good can serve
as collateral. This parameter β will represent the degree of financial development of the economy. We show that the magnitude of the under-supply
can be larger when the price of the collateral is endogenous, giving rise to
a Liquidity Under-Supply Multiplier. Any policy intervention that affects
the interest rate in equilibrium will have two effects on the borrowing constraint: a direct effect, also present in the case when the credit constraint is
exogenous, and an indirect effect through the price of the collateral.
Next, we explore our findings in a particular example in which utilities
for the consumption good and the collateral are quadratic. In this context,
we can be more precise about the effects on liquidity of the degree of financial
development, β, and the marginal utility λ, of collateral. First, in economies
where the market value of collateral is low (because λ is low), there will
always be liquidity under-supply, no matter how high β is. The government
should intervene, for example, by taxing illiquid investments. Paradoxically,
as β increases and the financial system becomes more developed, the need
for government intervention (taxation) increases. For higher values of λ,
the liquidity under-supply is non-monotonic in β, increasing for low values
and decreasing for high values of β. Similarly, the liquidity under-supply
multiplier is increasing in β for low values of λ and becomes non-monotonic
in β for high values of λ.
Finally, in the last two sections we show that the results continue to
hold in a stationary equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model or in
a model with uncertainty.
3

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present diagrams explaining the general principles of Offsetting Distortions and Non-Monotone
Second Best Inefficiency. In Section 3 we briefly discuss different definitions
of liquidity used in the literature as well as the definitions we will consider.
Section 4 presents the model and shows the liquidity under-supply result.
In Section 5 we show that the liquidity under-supply is non-monotone in the
credit constraint. In Section 6 we endogenize the credit constraint and prove
the existence of the liquidity under supply multiplier. Also we solve and simulate the quadratic example. In Section 7 we note that all the preceding
results continue to hold in a stationary equilibrium in an Overlapping Generations Model. Section 8 shows that adding uncertainty does not cause any
qualitative changes, but it does increase the magnitude of the under-supply.
All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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Offsetting Distortions and Non-Monotone Inefficiencies

2.1

Offsetting Distortions Principle

Consider a market with its demand, D, supply, S, and initial equilibrium
at A as shown in Figure 1. There are no distortions of any kind in this
market and hence the equilibrium is First Best efficient. Suppose now that
we introduce some distortion to demand, say δ1 . The new demand is D(δ1 )
instead of D and the new equilibrium price and quantities are smaller at
point B. Given the demand distortion, the reduction in quantity can be
interpreted as a supply inefficiency since a central planner could compensate
for the demand dislocation by introducing a distortion to supply, shifting
the curve to S(δ1 ). At the new equilibrium C, the quantity is restored to its
original First Best level, though the equilibrium price is lower than before.
The Offsetting Distortions principle1 states that a distortion in demand
can often be understood as an inefficiency of supply, even though the demanders are completely different from the suppliers. If the central planner
knows he cannot restore demand, then he must regard supply as in need of
stimulation.
In this paper we use the Offsetting Distortions principle to see how an
aggregate under-supply of liquidity can arise from inefficiencies in the de1

The Offseting Distortions principle is not novel. The idea, that a distortion on demand
calls for a perturbation of supply, reminds us of what has been known as the Second Best
Theory developed by Lancaster and Lipsey during the 1950s.
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Figure 1: Offsetting Distortions and First Best Monotonicity.
mand for credit. A collateral restriction that reduces the effective demand
for loans can be interpreted as an inefficiency in the supply of loans. In
effect, the collateral restriction on demand for loans manifests itself as an
under-supply of liquidity, since loans can only be offered out of a pool of
liquid capital created in the previous period.

2.2

Non-Monotone Inefficiencies

We take for granted that the demand distortion cannot be undone, and focus
attention on the inefficiency of supply. Define the First Best Inefficiency as
the difference between the First Best quantity (which could be restored
if supply perturbations were unconstrained), and the quantity supplied in
equilibrium under demand distortions but before intervention. For instance,
in Figure 1 the First Best Inefficiency associated with the demand distortion
δ1 , what we denoted by F B(δ1 ), is the difference between the quantities at
C (or A) and B. Consider now a larger demand distortion, say δ2 > δ1 . The
First Best inefficiency associated to δ2 , F B(δ2 ), is given by the difference in
quantities at E (or A) and D. Clearly, F B(δ1 ) < F B(δ2 ). The First Best
Inefficiency is a monotone function of the demand distortion.
Suppose, however, that the central planner is constrained in how he
can perturb supply. For example, suppose he cannot increase supply for
prices below a lower limit of p∗ . The equilibrium quantity attained after the
planner intervenes optimally, but subject to this constraint, will be called
the Second Best quantity.
5

Figure 2: Offsetting Distortions and Second Best Non-Monotonicity.
Define the Second Best Inefficiency as the difference between the Second
Best quantity and the equilibrium quantity attained without intervention.
Surprisingly, the Second Best Inefficiency is not monotone in the demand
distortion. As we can see in Figure 2, if the demand distortion were small
enough, such as δ = δ1 , in fact for all 0 < δ < δ2 , the central planner would
be able to restore the quantity all the way back to its first best level. Thus,
the Second Best inefficiency is equal to the First Best Inefficiency, and grows
with δ.
But for δ > δ2 , the Second Best Inefficiency declines as δ increases.
For instance, consider the demand distortion δ3 , as in Figure 2. Given the
constraint faced by the central planner, it is clear that the best he can do is
to perturb supply to S(δ3 ) resulting in a Second Best quantity at point C.
Although this quantity is bigger than the one at B, it is far below the first
best level at A, and not much bigger than at B.
A last observation is that the Second Best Inefficiency becomes bigger
when the demand curve becomes flatter. We will turn to this point at the
end of the paper.
In Figure 3 we can see the different behavior of the First Best and Second
Best Inefficiencies. The dotted curve represents the First Best Inefficiency
as a function of the distortion δ, while the full one represents the Second
Best Inefficiency. While the First Best Inefficiency is a monotone function
of the demand distortion, the Second Best Inefficiency is not.
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Figure 3: First Best and Second Best Inefficiency.

3

Defining Liquidity

Liquidity, and the closely related notion of flexibility, are intuitively understood by economists and others. However, when one tries to distil these
notions into precise definitions, one finds that liquidity has been defined in
many different ways.
According to some authors, like Shubik (1999) or Kiyotaki–Moore (2000),
liquidity refers to a substance, like gold, which is accepted as a means of
payment. An illiquid agent who is very rich in other goods may not be able
to make purchases, at least for the moment, because he lacks gold or cash.
A second definition of liquidity refers to the thinness of the market for
some good. An agent is in possession of an illiquid good if he cannot quickly
sell it without a big discount. Clearly, this definition tries to capture the idea
of flexibility mentioned before. It is about speed of reaction and about how
costly it is to change financial position if needed. This is the most common
notion used by market participants. It is also often used as a definition in
academics as in Diamond (1986), Jones–Ostroy (1984), Morris–Shin (2003).
A third definition of liquidity stresses the completeness of markets. Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) define liquidity as the availability of instruments
that can be used to transfer wealth across periods. An economy is more
liquid than another if it has more markets. These authors particularly emphasize the ability of private agents to purchase a variety of assets that
transfer wealth to the future. They suggest that the government can increase liquidity by creating and selling debt, which the private agents can
7

then hold as a hedge against production emergencies.
A fourth definition is what we call financial liquidity. How liquid an agent
is depends on his ability to borrow against the present value of his future
income, that is, to sell contingent promises of future deliveries. Financial liquidity depends not only on the presence of various contingent promises, but
also on the ability of agents to credibly commit to honor these promises, say
by issuing collateral. This notion of liquidity is the one used in Geanakoplos
(1997, 2003), Diamond–Rajan (2001), Caballero–Krishnamurthy (2001).
Finally, the last notion is what we call physical liquidity. As the name
suggests, this notion refers to the flexibility to move goods across different
projects. A project is liquid if an investor can move his physical inputs to
another project as easily as he could if he has kept them in storage.
All these definitions try to capture in a different way the idea of flexibility: flexibility to make transactions, flexibility to exit a market and change
portfolio composition quickly and without cost, flexibility to move wealth
across time given that agents can buy or sell contingent promises and finally,
flexibility to move goods across different activities or projects.
In this paper we will focus in the last two notions of liquidity: financial
liquidity and physical liquidity. We shall find that when agents take liquidity
decisions in a decentralized way, the economy as a whole will produce too
little liquidity. In the next sections we will use the general principles of
Offsetting Distortions and Non-Monotonicity of the Second Best Inefficiency
to understand financial and physical liquidity under-supply as well as the
non-monotone behavior of these inefficiencies.

4

Liquidity Under-Supply

4.1

The Model

Consider an economy in which there are three periods, t = 0, 1, 2, and a
single consumption good which is durable, and hence serves as a store of
value as well as for productive investment. All consumption takes place in
the last period. There is a continuum of firms of two types: firms of type
L, lenders, and firms of type B, borrowers.
At t = 0 a type L firm is endowed with a single unit of the good. He
has two investment options. The first is a long-term (illiquid) investment
that has a constant gross return of H per unit of investment at t = 2, while
the second is short-term (liquid) and pays h1 < H at t = 1 per unit of
investment. At stage 0 firm L decides on the percentage α ∈ [0, 1] of the
good to invest in the short-term project.
8

An L firm arrives at period 1 with αh1 wealth from his short-term investment. At this point he has to decide how much to lend, y, to a type B
firm, from which he gets a payoff of y(1 + ρ) at t = 2, where ρ is the market
interest rate. There exists another investment option which pays h2 per unit
of investment at t = 2. The decisions faced by an L firm at different periods
can be seen in Figure 4.

Figure 4: L’s decisions.
Type B firms only play a role at t = 1. Each B firm has an investment
opportunity with a gross return per unit invested of R > 1 at t = 2. We
will assume that the return of this investment is extremely good, i.e., Rh1 >
H > h1 h2 . Each B firm has no endowment and therefore chooses to borrow
x from type L firms. However, each B firm is credit constrained, i.e., the
amount she can borrow has to satisfy,
(1 + ρ)x ≤ Π
where Π is an exogenous limit to what the firm can promise.2 This constitutes the only market imperfection present in the economy.
Finally, at period t = 2 debts are paid back and consumption is realized.
2

It will be crucial that the amount x that can be borrowed is a decreasing function of
the interest rate ρ. This is perfectly natural since the promised payments are not delivered
until the next period. This kind of credit constraint is standard in the literature. There
are many different micro foundations stories that justify it; moral hazard problems, the
need of collateral, etc. In the last part of the paper we will interpret the credit constraint
in terms of collateral restrictions.
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Agents in this economy care only about output in t = 2. There is no
uncertainty of any kind.
In this model, the measure of liquidity is given by α. The short-term
investment gives a firm of type L the flexibility at t = 1 to reinvest the
physical good into two different new projects: he can invest in a new project
that returns h2 at t = 2 or he can decide to enter in the credit market which
would give him a return of 1 + ρ. On the other hand, the portion of the
initial investment devoted to the long-term investment, 1 − α, gives him a
return of H at t = 2 but no flexibility at all at t = 1 to move those physical
goods to other projects. With this interpretation α is a measure of physical
liquidity. Suppose now that L firms at time 0 are endowed with a certain
amount of cash instead. They can buy a long-term asset that pays H at
t = 2. However, once in this position, they cannot sell any promise at t = 1
using as collateral the present value of their future income H. On the other
hand, they can invest a proportion α of their initial cash holdings on a shortterm investment with a return of h1 at t = 1. In the second period they
have two financial options, invest with a return of h2 or enter into the credit
market which will yield a return of 1 + ρ. Clearly, with this interpretation
α now becomes a measure of financial liquidity.
At t = 0, L firms face the option of a liquid investment or an illiquid
one. The illiquid investment has a higher return than the liquid investment,
but the latter allows firms L to become lenders at t = 1.
Since every agent cares only about output in period 2, any Pareto efficient allocation would maximize period 2 output. Hence, we take total
output in period 2 as our measure of welfare. Since Rh1 > H, the first best
thing to do from a social point of view is to invest everything in the liquid
option, α = 1, and then lend it all, y = h1 , to the B firms. As we will see,
this will not be the outcome in equilibrium.
Let us be more precise about all this.
Definition 1: An equilibrium in this economy consists of decisions (αEQ , yEQ , xEQ )
and a price, ρEQ such that,
(a) L firms choose αEQ in period 0 and yEQ in period 1 such that (αEQ , yEQ )
solves

(1 − α)H + (αh1 − y)h2 + y(1 + ρEQ )

 max
α,y
.
s.t. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1


0 ≤ y ≤ αh1
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(b) B firms choose xEQ in period 1 such that (xEQ ) solves
(
max Rx − (1 + ρEQ )x
x
.
s.t. 0 ≤ (1 + ρEQ )x ≤ Π
(c) xEQ = yEQ .
Firms maximize consumption at period 2 taking the price as given and
markets clear. We have assumed 0 < h1 h2 < H < Rh1 . The nature of the
equilibrium depends on whether Π < H, H < Π < Rh1 or Π ≥ Rh1 . The
equilibrium in this model can be seen in Figure 5 (in the case Π < h1 h2 ).

Figure 5: Equilibrium in the case Π < h1 h2 .
The decreasing curve


h
i 1+ρ>R
 0,
Π
0, 1+ρ , 1 + ρ = R
D(ρ) =

 Π
1+ρ<R
1+ρ ,

(1)

represents the constrained demand of the B firms for loans x.
The L firms will put all the good at t = 0 into the illiquid investment if
H > h1 (1 + ρ), and all the good into the liquid investment if H < h1 (1 + ρ).
Once they have invested α into the liquid investment, they will lend all αh1
if 1 + ρ > h2 . The long-run supply of y is thus

1 + ρ < H/h1
 0,
[0, h1 ], 1 + ρ = H/h1 .
LS(ρ) =
(2)

h1 ,
1 + ρ > H/h1
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The short-run supply of y is

1 + ρ < h2
 0,
[0, αh1 ], 1 + ρ = h2 .
SS(ρ, α) =

αh1 ,
1 + ρ > h2

(3)

The dotted and filled curves represent, respectively, the long- and the shortrun supply of loans y by the L firms.
When 0 < Π < H the decreasing part of the demand curve cuts the
supply curve on its horizontal segment, as shown in Figure 5. In that case
the equilibrium is 1 + ρEQ = H/h1 , yEQ = xEQ = Πh1 /H and αEQ =
Π/H. Clearly, equilibrium is not First Best efficient, since B firms borrow
Πh1 /H < h1 , and output is H(1 − Π/H) + Rh1 Π/H < Rh1 .
When Π ≥ Rh1 the demand curve cuts the vertical part of the supply
curve where y = h1 and the equilibrium is 1 + ρEQ = R, yEQ = xEQ = h1
and αEQ = 1. For H ≤ Π ≤ Rh1 , the downward sloping piece of the
demand curve cuts the vertical part of the supply curve where y = h1 . The
equilibrium quantity is still First Best, although the interest rate is smaller:
H/h1 < 1 + ρEQ < R, yEQ = xEQ = h1 and αEQ = 1.
Figure 5 illustrates the case where Π < h1 h2 < H, so that demand cuts
not only the horizontal line (1 + ρ) = H/h1 , but also the horizontal line
(1 + ρ) = h2 before y = h1 .

4.2

Liquidity Under-Supply

As we saw above, for low enough Π, B firms cannot borrow all they would
like, and it is no surprise that the equilibrium is not First Best efficient.
However, we now show that equilibrium is not even Second Best efficient.
The constraint on borrowing at time 1 induces optimizing L firms to underinvest in the liquid option. Had they invested more in liquid capital, total
output would have been higher, even if the borrowing constraint Π remained
binding.
Definition 2: A pair of decisions (αCE , yCE , xCE ) and prices ρCE is said
to be Constrained Efficient if:
(a) The choice αCE at t = 0 maximizes total output at t = 2, assuming
that at t = 1 markets clear, i.e.,
(b) Given αCE and ρCE , L chooses yCE and B chooses xCE to maximize
their own output.
12

(c) xEQ = yEQ .
More precisely, we can think of a Constrained Efficient allocation (αCE , yCE , xCE , ρCE ),
as the one that solve the following maximization problem:

max
(1 − α)H + (αh1 − y)h2 + yR


α,y,x,ρ



 s.t.
0(≤ α ≤ 1





max (αh1 − z)h2 + (1 + ρCE )z

z
y solves
.
s.t. 0 ≤ z ≤ αh1
(




max Rw − (1 + ρCE )w


w
x solves



s.t.
0 ≤ (1 + ρCE )w ≤ Π



x=y
Proposition 1: Liquidity Under-Supply. Suppose Π < H and h1 h2 <
H < Rh1 . Then the equilibrium in this economy is not Constrained Efficient.
In particular, αEQ < αCE , i.e., there is an under-supply of physical liquidity
with respect to the Constrained Efficient allocation.
Having in mind the offsetting distortions principle, this result should
not come as a big surprise. In fact, it is a particular case of that principle. Credit constraints, Π, play the role of demand distortions, δ. As we
saw, any distortion in demand can be understood as an inefficiency of supply, even though the demanders are completely different from the suppliers.
Proposition 1 shows that this is also true for liquidity.
Consider first the case when Π < h1 h2 as shown in Figure 6. The
only new element added to Figure 5 is the filled curve to the right, which
represents the short-run supply curve after constrained efficient choice αCE .
As we can see in the figure, αEQ = Π/H < αCE = Π/h1 h2 < 1, so the
equilibrium is not Constrained Efficient.
One can interpret the inefficiency as due to an externality. In equilibrium, lenders L at time t = 0 forecast a depressed equilibrium interest rate
1 + ρ and quantity at t = 1, coming from the intersection of their longrun supply curve and the constrained demand. Given this forecast, they
optimally choose α which determines their short-run supply. This curve
intersects the demand at the same quantity and price H/h1 .
Suppose now, that firms L had chosen a bigger α so that the short-run
supply curve had been the one to the right. At this equilibrium, the interest
rate is lower and the quantity borrowed is larger. Exactly this constitutes
the externality, for the increase in the supply not only has the usual effect
13

Figure 6: Liquidity under-supply in the case Π < h1 h2 .
of lowering the price, but also loosens the borrowing constraint of firms
B. These firms can make strictly positive profits from each extra unit they
borrow due to the wedge between the equilibrium interest rate and the return
R. Ex-ante, lenders L do not internalize this effect. From the social point
of view, the supply of liquidity should be stimulated until the interest rate
1 + ρ at t = 1 falls to h2 . If the central planner knows he cannot restore
demand for credit, then he must regard supply as in need of stimulation.
When h1 h2 ≤ Π < H, a similar situation prevails, which we describe
in Figure 7. In this case αEQ = Π/H < αCE = 1 and the central planner
intervention attains the First Best quantity (even though not the First Best
interest rate.)
A last observation is that the result hinges only on the presence of credit
constraints, in particular, it does not depend on the linear structure of the
model.

4.3

Implementing the Second Best

We have seen that in equilibrium, optimizing agents will choose too little
liquidity. A central planner could induce more liquid investments in several
ways. Suppose however, that the only policy tool available to the planner is
taxation. One method would be to tax the illiquid investment at time 0. The
lack of government intervention at time 1 presumably would be explained by
supposing the government could not distinguish between liquid investments,
or because it could not modify h2 (for instance if h2 were the international
14

Figure 7: Liquidity under-supply in the case h1 h2 ≤ Π < H.
interest rate).

5

Non-Monotonicity of the Liquidity Under-Supply

The central planner in our model is constrained. Since in the second period there is an outside option with return h2 , the central planner cannot
modify the supply of loans below 1 + ρ = h2 . This plays the role of p∗
discussed before. Therefore, our model belongs to the Second Best world.
As a result, we should expect a non-monotone relation between the liquidity
under-supply, (in our previous terminology, the Second Best Inefficiency),
and the credit constraint (the demand distortion) that creates it. This is
exactly what Proposition 2 shows.
Definition 3:

For each Π, define the Liquidity Under-Supply as
LU S(Π) = αCE (Π) − αEQ (Π).

Proposition 2: Non-monotonicity of the Liquidity Under-Supply.
Suppose Π < H and h1 h2 < H < Rh1 . Then the Liquidity Under-Supply
is a non-monotone function of the credit constraint Π. In particular, the
derivative satisfies
LU S 0 (Π) > 0 for all Π < h1 h2
LU S 0 (Π) < 0 for all Π ∈ (h1 h2 , H).
15

Figure 8: Liquidity Under-Supply. Cases Π < h1 h2 and Π ∈ [h1 h2 , H]
The non-monotonicity of the Liquidity Under-Supply can be seen in Figure 8. It is increasing in the “low Π” zone while decreasing in the “high Π”
zone. In this simple framework, we can think of Π as the degree of financial
development of the economy. Any financial innovation (expressed by an increase in Π) at very low levels paradoxically makes government intervention
(taxation) more necessary. As credit markets begin to get more sophisticated, the distortions if markets work in a decentralized way become bigger.
On the other hand, once the credit markets are sophisticated, as in the
“high Π” zone, credit market innovations lower the distortion and the costs
of non-intervention become smaller. Although the model is too simple to
really think about policy implications, we think this non-monotonicity property could have interesting implications for Emerging Markets economies.
Finally, note that the alternative investment opportunity h2 is a critical
ingredient of the non-monotonicity. The essence of liquidity is flexibility, so
the presence of such alternatives goes hand in hand with liquidity. Therefore, the non-monotonicity of the under-supply of liquidity is an inevitable
consequence of its nature.

6
6.1

Endogenous Credit Constraints and the Liquidity Under-Supply Multiplier
The Model

So far we have taken Π to be exogenous. Now we show that by introducing
collateral explicitly into the model, the credit constraint can be taken to be
endogenous. This is important, because once Π is endogenous, the demand
for liquidity might become much more elastic, increasing the second best
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inefficiency and hence the liquidity under-supply.
Let us extend the model by introducing a perfectly durable and divisible
good at time t = 1, called the collateral good, owned in its entirety of one
unit by B firms. We will assume that there is no market at time 1 for this
good. It gives no utility to any agent at time t = 1, but it is desired by B
firms for consumption at time t = 2. The good is also useful because a B
firm can use a proportion β ∈ (0, 1] of it as collateral for his borrowing at
time t = 1. We suppose that B firms have no incentive to repay any money
on their loans, but that the collateral can be seized by the lender and sold
to make them whole. Since the good is perfectly durable, if its price at time
t = 2 is sure to be Π2 , then lenders will be willing to accept promises of βΠ2
due at time t = 2, and therefore the credit constraint faced by the borrowers
is
(1 + ρ)x ≤ βΠ2 .
In this new context, β can be interpreted as the degree of financial development of the economy. This is a natural interpretation since financial
markets become more sophisticated as the proportion of the durable goods
in the economy that can be used as collateral increases.
Before we move on, we need to extend the definition of competitive
equilibrium for this model.
Definition 4: A Collateral Equilibrium allocation consists of lenders and
∗ ∗
B∗ B∗
∗
∗
borrowers decisions (α∗ , y ∗ , C2L ∗ , cL
2 , x , C2 , c2 ) and prices (ρ , Π2 ) such
that:
(a) L firms choose liquidity α∗ in period 0, lending y ∗ in period 1 and
∗
collateral C2L∗ and consumption cL
2 in period 2 such that they solve,

max
UL (cL

2)

L ,cL

α,y,C
2 2

s.t.
0≤α≤1
.


0
≤
y
≤
αh
1


∗
cL
2 ≤ (1 − α)H + (αh1 − y)h2 + y(1 + ρ )
(b) B firms choose borrowing level x∗ in period 1, collateral C2B ∗ and
∗
consumption cL
2 such that they solve

max UB (C2B , cB

2)
 x,C
B B
2 ,c2
.
s.t.
0 ≤ (1 + ρ∗ )x ≤ βΠ∗2


∗ B
∗
∗
cB
2 + Π2 C2 ≤ Rx − (1 + ρ )x + Π2
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(c) x∗ = y ∗ .
(d) C2L ∗ + C2B ∗ = 1.
Since the supply of the collateral good is fixed at 1, any Pareto efficient
allocation maximizes the output of the consumption good c2 . Thus again,
B
we take cL
2 + c2 as our measure of welfare. Hence, as before, we define
a constrained efficient choice of liquidity αCE at time t = 0 as one that
B
maximizes total output cL
2 + c2 in period 2 assuming that markets clear at
t = 1.
Suppose first that the utility of consumption of the output cB
2 and the
collateral C2B by B firms at time t = 2 is
B
B
UB (C2B , cB
2 ) = c2 + Π2 C2

where Π2 is constant. It is evident that an equilibrium in this case is precisely
the same as the one we computed earlier in Section 4. Central planner
interventions could take many forms, but we concentrate on the taxation of
illiquid investments. Starting from an equilibrium in which 1 + ρ = H/h1 ,
and 0 < α < 1, it is easy to see that a sufficiently small ε tax on illiquid
investments would lower equilibrium 1 + ρ by the same ε/h1 . But once we
know equilibrium 1 + ρ, we can compute the equilibrium borrowing x of firm
B very easily. From the credit constraint we get that
dx
Π2 β
=−
.
dρ
(1 + ρ)2
A change in the interest rate has only a direct effect on the demand for
loans. The situation is different when Π2 becomes an endogenous variable
as we show next. We now turn to non-linear utility UB .
Let us assume that utility UB treats C2B and cB
2 as complements. Accordingly, define B’s marginal rate of substitution of c2 for C2 by Π2 (cB
2)
and assume
Π2 (cB
2)≡

B
∂UB (1, cB
2 )/∂C2
B
∂U (1, cB
2 )/∂c2

Π02 (cB
2 ) > 0.
Proposition 3: Liquidity Under-Supply Multiplier. Suppose h1 h2 <
H < Rh1 . If in equilibrium B firms borrow x < h1 , then the change in
equilibrium borrowing occasioned by a change in (1 + ρ) has derivative
Π2 β
dx
= −η
dρ
(1 + ρ)2
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where, η = {(1 + βΠ02 )/(1 − [βΠ02 /(1 + ρ)]}[(R − (1 + ρ)]) > 1, is the Liquidity
Under-Supply Multiplier.
Lower ρ, after intervention, enables the B firms to borrow more, even
if Π2 does not change. This is the direct effect we already saw with Π2
fixed. Lower ρ also increases the profit of B firms, even if they borrowed
the same amount. Borrowing more further increases their profit, since on
the margin R > (1 + ρ). Increasing the profit of the B firms boosts their
B
consumption of cB
2 (the consumption of C2 cannot increase, since supply
is fixed at 1). By assumption, this increases the relative marginal utility of
C2B , thus increasing Π2 in the future. But lenders can forecast this future
increment on Π2 , which in turn raises the ability of B firms to borrow,
causing a big multiplier effect. This is the indirect effect. We can see this in
Figure 9.
Our amplification mechanism is similar in spirit to Kiyotaki–Moore (1998).
In their work a constrained demand reduces the productivity of assets, causing the fall in asset prices and further constraining demand. Our paper
pushes this mechanism a step further, noticing that the amplification reaches
the supply side as well, since it makes the under-supply even bigger.

Figure 9: The Liquidity Under Supply Multiplier.

6.2

An Example

L
B B
In particular let us assume that UL (C2L , cL
2 ) = c2 and that UB (C2 , c2 ) =
B 2
B
µcB
2 − (1/2)(c2 ) + λC2
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The following discussion is in terms of the parameters β and λ. As we
said before, β is a measure of financial development of the economy, since
the extent to which durable goods can be used as collateral depends on the
presence of institutions like courts that guarantee that function. On the
other hand, how efficient a good is in its function as collateral depends also
on its market value, which depends on price times quantity. Since without
loss of generality we choose units such that the total quantity of collateral
is 1, this aspect is represented in our model by λ, the borrowers’ marginal
utility of collateral. The two variables are of vital importance. For instance,
houses will not be a reasonable collateral if they have a very low value
regardless of the presence of an efficient judicial system. Valuable goods
will not be regarded as good collateral without a court system capable of
enforcing confiscation. The following three propositions study the effect of
β and λ on the liquidity under-supply, its behavior as a function of β and
the liquidity under supply multiplier.
Proposition 4: Liquidity Under-Supply (LUS). Suppose h1 h2 <
H < Rh1 , µ > Rh1 + 1 and λ > 0. Then ∃λ1 > 0 such that:
(a) ∀λ < λ1 , LU S(β) > 0, ∀β ∈ (0, 1].
(b) ∀λ > λ1 , ∃β1 (λ) > 0 such that LU S(β) > 0, ∀β < β1 (λ).

In economies where the market value of collateral is low there will always
be liquidity under-supply, no matter how high β is. If the government cannot
change β or λ, it should, for example, tax illiquid investments. However,
when the market value of collateral is high enough, there exists liquidity
under supply provided the level of financial development is low.
Proposition 5: Non-Monotonicity of LUS. Suppose h1 h2 < H <
Rh1 , µ > Rh1 + 1 and λ > 0. Then ∃λ0 < λ1 such that:
(a) ∀λ > λ0 , LU S(β) is a non-monotone function. This is, ∃β0 (λ) <
β1 (λ) such that LU S 0 (β) > 0, ∀β < β0 (λ) and LU S 0 (β) ≤ 0, ∀β >
β0 (λ)
(b) ∀λ < λ0 , LU S 0 (β) > 0, ∀β ∈ (0, 1].
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Proposition 6: Non-Monotonicity of the LUS Multiplier. Suppose
h1 h2 < H < Rh1 , µ > Rh1 + 1 and λ > 0. Then
(a) ∀λ > λ1 , η(β) is a non-monotone function, this is, η 0 (β) > 0, ∀β <
β1 (λ) and η 0 (β) ≤ 0, ∀β > β1 (λ).
(b) ∀λ < λ1 , η 0 (β) > 0, ∀β ∈ (0, 1].

Proposition 5 and 6 can be summarized as follows. When the market
value of collateral is too low, any financial innovation expressed by an increase in β, regardless of how sophisticated the economy was to start with,
will lead to a bigger liquidity under-supply. This inefficiency is even more
dramatic, since the multiplier also gets bigger with the innovation. On the
other hand, for higher levels of marginal utility of collateral, the behavior of
the liquidity under-supply and the multiplier becomes non-monotone. For
very low levels of financial development, any increase in β will make the
under-supply and the multiplier bigger. However, for developed markets,
any innovation will reduce both.
The implications of the example for emerging markets are potentially
interesting. These economies are often characterized by durable (often nontradable) goods with low market values (at least during big crises) or weak
court systems that reduce the range of goods that can serve as collateral.
It is difficult not to think about the financial innovation and simultaneous,
dramatic, reduction of government participation in financial markets that
took place in Latin American economies during the 90s. Numerous liquidity
crises occurred in these economies during that period.
Finally, to illustrate more clearly the example, we run a simulation of
the model for parameter values of R = 3, H = 2, h1 = 1, h2 = 1 and
µ = 7. It turns out that the cut values for λ are λ0 = 6, λ1 = 12. The
following graphs present the result of the simulation. The first one is for
λ = 5, in which there is always liquidity under-supply, and both the liquidity
under-supply and the multiplier are increasing.
The second corresponds to λ = 10, in which the liquidity under-supply
is always positive but now becomes non-monotone as a function of β. The
multiplier is still increasing.
Finally, for the case λ = 20, liquidity under-supply can be zero for high
enough values of β, and both liquidity under-supply and the multiplier become non-monotone.
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Figure 10: Liquidity Under-Supply. Cases λ = 5 and λ = 10

Figure 11: Case λ = 20

7

Liquidity Under-Supply in a Stationary Overlapping Generations Model

So far we have assumed a highly non-stationary environment in which the
borrower only arrives on the scene when the lender is already middle-aged.
One might wonder if our results remain intact if we assume a stationary
environment. In fact, the under-supply becomes even more acute.
Suppose now that time extends indefinitely, t = ..., −1, 0, 1, ..... In every
period t a new type B firm is born with the same technology we have already
assumed. She can produce R units of output in period t + 1 for every unit
of input in period t. She has no endowment, and is constrained to borrow at
most Π/(1 + ρ), where ρ is the stationary one period interest rate on loans.
Each period a type L firm is born with an endowment of one unit of the
good in its youth. The L firm lives three periods. As before, when young it
can choose to put its wealth into an illiquid two-period investment that pays
H per unit of input in period t + 2, or it can invest in a liquid one-period
22

investment that pays h per unit input in period t + 1. In period t + 1 it can
take the receipts from its liquid investment from period t and invest that in
another liquid investment, again paying h in period t + 2 per unit invested
in period t + 1. We suppose that h2 < H < R2 .
The only difference is that now the L firm has another liquid option. It
can lend in its youth to the contemporaneous young B firm, and again it
can lend in its middle age to the next young B firm. Let α0 (α1 ) be the
amount loaned at rate h when the firm is young (middle-aged) and y0 (y1 )
be the amount loaned at rate (1 + ρ) when the firm is young (middle-aged).
Now the liquidity of the firm when young is α0 + y0 , and the firm liquidity
is α0 h + y0 (1 + ρ) when middle-aged.
Consumption in old age is
c = (1 − α0 − y0 )H + y1 (1 + ρ) + α1 h
α1 + y1 = α0 h + y0 (1 + ρ)
Equilibrium can take many forms, depending on the value of the exogeΠ√
nous Π. Suppose that √H(1+
< 1. Then it is easy to see that there is a
H)
stationary equilibrium in which
√
(1 + ρ) = H > h
α0 = α1 = 0
Π
√
y0 = √
H(1 + H)
Π
√
y1 =
(1 + H)
Π√
The young lender puts 1− √H(1+
into the illiquid investment, and invests
H)
√

Π√
H(1+ H)

as a loan to the young B firm. At the same time the middle-aged

L firm invests

Π
√
(1+ H)

into the same B firm. The B firm is borrowing up to

Π√
its limit of Π/(1 + ρ) = √ΠH = √H(1+
+ (1+Π√H) .
H)
Equilibrium is constrained inefficient. Suppose the central planner is
constrained not to touch h or Π. Nevertheless, he could boost output by
taxing H at the rate t solving H(1 − t) = h2 . The young L firm would shift
part of its wealth to the liquid investment, driving the equilibrium interest
rate 1 + ρ down to h. This would loosen the credit constraint allowing B
firms to borrow more than in the decentralized equilibrium described above.
In this stationary framework the tax is doubly effective. When the young
L firm shifts funds from the illiquid investment into the liquid loan to the
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√
B firm, it boosts output at once, since R > H. And since this is a liquid
investment, it also frees up more funds for the firm to loan when it is middleaged, boosting ouput again.
The liquidity under-supply can be non-monotone in Π. As the reader
may remember, that property relied only on the presence of an alternative
investment opportunity h which is also present in this model. If we were to
endogenize Π, as we did in Section 6, we would also get a liquidity undersupply multiplier.

8

Uncertainty

Uncertainty has played no role in our model. Indeed, it is not needed to generate under-supply or non-monotonicity. Introducing it does not change the
qualitative features of the under-supply, but is can increase its magnitude.
Suppose now that the return R of the B firms is stochastic: with probability p it is R, as before, but with probability (1 − p) it is 0. The idea is
that in normal states of nature, with probability 1 − p, the B firms have no
opportunity to invest at time t = 1. In extraordinary, perhaps crisis, situations they have a huge opportunity or need to invest with borrowed money.
The question is, will liquidity providers, rationally anticipating these events,
provide for the right amount of liquidity at t = 0?
The answer is no, for the reasons given without uncertainty. Now, in
equilibrium H = (1 − p)h1 h2 + ph1 (1 + ρ), where ρ is the interest rate in the
event R > 0. It is easy to see that if p is small, and H > h1 h2 , then ρ can be
enormous, choking off almost all borrowing by the B firms just when they
need the money the most. The under-supply can therefore be much more
severe.

9

Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the proposition by calculating the unique equilibrium in this
economy and comparing it with the social planner solution. In Section 4
we already showed that the equilibrium in the case Π < H is given by
{(αEQ , yEQ , xEQ ), (1 + ρEQ )} = {(Π/H, Πh1 /H, Πh1 /H), H/h1 }.
The planner chooses α in order to maximize total output at t = 2. It
is clear that in the case Π < h1 h2 , this is done for α = Π/h1 h2 . Therefore the constrained efficient solution is {(αCE , yCE , xCE ), (1 + ρCE )} =
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{(Π/h1 h2 , Π, Π), h2 } When Π ∈ [h1 h2 , H], by the same type of reasoning,
we have that {(αCE , yCE , xCE ), (1 + ρCE )} = {(1, h1 , h1 ), Π/h1 }.
Now, just notice that the equilibrium allocation is different from the
constrained efficient allocation, and in particular, αEQ = Π/h < αCE =
Π/h1 h2 since h1 h2 < H in the case Π < h1 h2 . In the case in which Π ∈
[h1 h2 , H] we have that αEQ = Π/H < αCE = 1.

Proof of Proposition 2
It is a straightforward calculation to see that LU S 0 (Π) = 1/h1 h2 − 1/H > 0
in the case Π < h1 h2 , while LU S 0 (Π) = −1/H < 0 in the case Π ∈ [h1 h2 , H]
using the allocations calculated in the proof of Proposition 1.

Proof of Proposition 3
In equilibrium when the borrowing constraint is binding we must have3 cB
2 =
B
B
Rx−(1+ρ)x and x = βΠ2 (c2 )/(1+ρ). Therefore x(ρ) = βΠ2 (c2 )/(1+ρ) =
βΠ2 (Rx(ρ)−(1+ρ)x(ρ))/(1+ρ). Hence, dx = −[βΠ2 /(1+ρ)2 ]dρ+[βΠ02 /(1+
ρ)]{[R − (1 + ρ)]dx − xdρ}. Rearranging terms and using x = βΠ2 /(1 + ρ)
gives, dx/dρ = {βΠ2 (1 + βΠ02 )/[1 − βΠ02 /(1 + ρ)]}[R − (1 + ρ)] · 1/(1 + ρ)2 .
Denote by η = {(1 + βΠ02 )/[1 − βΠ02 /(1 + ρ)]}[(R − (1 + ρ)] the Liquidity
under-supply Multiplier. Then, we have that dx/dρ = −η[βΠ2 /(1 + ρ)2 ].
Notice that as long as Π02 > 0 and R > (1 + ρ), this is much more sensitive.

Proof of Proposition 4
1. Calculation of Allocations
Solving for period t = 2 : It is very clear that lenders and borrowers
B
decisions are C2L = 0, cL
2 = (1 − α)H + (αh1 − y)h2 + (1 + ρ)y, C2 = 1,
B
c2 = Rx − (1 + ρ)x.
Solving for period t = 1 : Lenders decisions are exactly the same in
Proposition 1. In analyzing borrowers decisions there are two cases depending on whether the credit constraint is binding or not.
3

It is clear that in equilibrium C2B = 1, hence the expression for consumption below
follows from the budget constraint.
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i) Credit constraint binding: In this


h
i
 0,
Π2
0,
x=
1+ρ ,

 Π2
1+ρ ,

case we have that
1+ρ>R
1+ρ=R .
1+ρ<R

(4)

From the budget constraint cB
2 = Rx − (1 + ρ)x. From the problem’s firstB
order conditions we have that Π2 = λ/(µ
p− c2 ). Combining these last three
expressions we get that Π2 = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ))]/2β(1 −
R/(1 + ρ). Plugging this expression for Π2 into (4), we get the demand for
loans. To solve for equilibrium we just solve equations (4) and (3) to get:
(
h2 ,
α ≥ βΠh12 h(h22 )
1+ρ=
(5)
(1 + ρ)∗ , α ≤ βΠh12 h(h22 )
where (1 + ρ)∗ solves the equation αh1 = βΠ2 (1 + ρ)/(1 + ρ).
ii) Credit constraint not binding: In this case, the demand for loans is

0,
1+ρ>R
.
(6)
x=
(0, ∞), 1 + ρ ≤ R
Furthermore, cB
2 = 0 and from the first-order conditions Π2 = λ/µ. Finally
to solve for equilibrium solve equations (3) and (6) to get that
1 + ρ = R.

(7)

Solving for period t = 0 :
Competitive equilibrium:
i) Credit constraint binding: The long-run supply of lenders is given by
(2). Taking into account (5) and (2) we have two cases:
In the first one 1 + ρ = H/h1 and therefore α = βΠ2 (H/h1 )/H.
The equilibrium allocation is:
Lenders: α = βΠ2 (H/h1 )/H, y = αh1 , C2L = 0, cL
2 = (1 − α)H + y(1 + ρ)
Borrowers: x = αh1 , C2B = 1, cB
=
Rx
−
(1
+
ρ)x
2
p
Prices: (1 + ρ) = H/h1 , Π2 = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ)]/2β(1 −
R/(1 + ρ).
In the second case, one of the two following conditions hold:
I) βΠ2 (H/h1 )/H > 1, II) µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(H/h1 ) < 0.
In this case α = 1 and 1 + ρ is given implicitly by the equation h1 =
βΠ2 (1 + ρ)/(1 + ρ). The equilibrium allocation is:
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Lenders: α = 1, y = αh1 , C2L = 0, cL
2 = (1 − α)H + y(1 + ρ)
Borrowers: x = αh1 , C2B = 1, cB
=
Rx − (1 + ρ)x
2
Prices: (1+ρ)pis given implicitly by the equation h1 = βΠ2 (1+ρ)/(1+ρ)
and Π2 = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ))]/2β(1 − R/(1 + ρ).
ii) Credit constraint not binding: Considering the long-run supply (2),
we have that since (1 + ρ) = R > H/h1 then α = 1. The equilibrium
allocation is:
Lenders: α = 1, y = h1 , C2L = 0, cL
2 = Rh1
B
B
Borrowers: x = h1 , C2 = 1, c2 = 0
Prices: (1 + ρ) = R, Π2 = λ/µ
Central Planner:
i) Credit constraint binding: The central planner chooses α in order to
maximize total output at t = 2, this is, (1 − α)H + (αh1 − y)h2 + Ry. Since
Rh1 > H, it is clear that he will choose α so that the B firms can borrow
all the way to the maximum, this time endogenously determined. Again we
have two cases:
In the first case, 1 + ρ = h2 and therefore α = βΠ2 (h2 )/h1 h1 .
The constrained efficient allocation is:
Lenders: α = βΠ2 (h2 )/h1 h2 , y = αh1 C2L = 0, cL
2 = (1 − α)H + y(1 + ρ)
B
B
Borrowers: x = αh1 , C2 = 1, c2 = Rx
p − (1 + ρ)x
Prices: (1 + ρ) = h2 , Π2 = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ))]/2β(1 −
R/(1 + ρ)).
In the second case, one of the two following conditions hold:
I0 ) βΠ2 (h2 )/h1 h2 > 1, II0 ) µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(h2 )) < 0
In this case α = 1 and 1 + ρ is given implicitly by the equation h1 =
βΠ2 (1 + ρ)/(1 + ρ).
The constrained efficient allocation is:
Lenders: α = 1, y = αh1 , C2L = 0, cL
2 = (1 − α)H + y(1 + ρ)
Borrowers: x = αh1 , C2B = 1, cB
=
Rx − (1 + ρ)x
2
Prices: (1+ρ) =p
is given implicitly by the equation h1 = βΠ2 (1+ρ)/(1+
ρ) and Π2 = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ))]/2β(1 − R/(1 + ρ)).
ii) Credit constraint not binding: This case is exactly as analyzed in
the case of decentralized equilibrium above.
2. Proof of (a) and (b)
Consider 4(λ, β, ρ)p
= µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ)) and
α(λ, β, ρ) = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ))]/2(1 − R/(1 + ρ))H. Let λ0
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such that solve 4(λ, 1, H/h1 ) = 0 and let λ00 such that solve α(λ, 1, H/h1 ) =
1. Define λ1 = min{λ0 , λ00 }.
(a) Given the definition of λ1 , the fact that α is an increasing function
of both β and λ and 4 is a decreasing function of both arguments,
implies that αEQ (β) < 1 ∀β ∈ (0, 1]. In this case
p
p
−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/h2 ) −µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − Rh1 /H)
LU S(β) =
.
−
2(1 − R/h2 )h1 h2
2(1 − Rh1 /H)H
Since H > h1 h2 , LU S(β) > 0 ∀β ∈ (0, 1]. Obviously this holds even
in the case αCE = 1.
(b) Given the definition of λ1 and the fact that α is a continuous increasing
function of both β and λ and 4 is a continuous decreasing function of
both arguments, implies for any λ > λ1 , ∃β1 (λ) > 0 such that αEQ = 1
and therefore LU S(β) > 0, ∀β < β1 (λ).

Proof of Proposition 5
Let λ+ such that solve 4(λ, 1, h2 ) = 0 and let λ++ such that solve α(λ, 1, h2 ) =
1. Define λ0 = min{λ+ , λ++ }. Clearly λ0 < λ1 since H > h1 h2 .
(a) Given the definition of λ0 by an analogous argument of (b) in the
proof of Proposition 4, ∀λ > λ0 , ∃β0 (λ) < β1 (λ) such that αCE = 1.
Therefore ∀β < β0 (λ), we have that
p
p
−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/h2 ) −µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − Rh1 /H)
LU S(β) =
−
2(1 − R/h2 )h1 h2
2(1 − Rh1 /H)H
and
λ(1 − R/h2 )
p
(1 − R/h2 )h1 h2 µ2 + 4λ1(1 − R/h2 )
λ(1 − Rh1 /H)
p
−
.
(1 − Rh1 /H)H µ2 + 4λ1(1 − Rh1 /H)

LU S 0 (β) =

It is easy to see that since H > h1 h2 , LU S 0 (β) > 0.
On the other hand, ∀β1 (λ) > β ≥ β0 (λ), we have that
p
−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − Rh1 /H)
LU S(β) = 1 −
2(1 − R1 /H)H
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and therefore,
LU S 0 (β) = −

λ(1 − Rh1 /H)
p
< 0.
(1 − R1 /H)H µ2 + 4λ1(1 − Rh1 /H)

Finally, it is clear that for β ≥ β1 (λ), LU S(β) = 0, and therefore
LU S 0 (β) = 0.
(b) It follows from definition of λ0 and the argument in the previous point
for the case of β < β0 (λ).

Proof of Proposition 6
From the equilibrium and the formula of Proposition 3,
1+
η=

1−

λ
R
(µ−β( 1+ρ
−1)Π2 )2

λ
R
(µ−β( 1+ρ
−1)Π2 )2

1
1+ρ (R

− (1 + ρ))

> 1.

Proof of (a)
Case β < β1
First we prove that Π2 (β) is an increasing function. Inp
this case the interest rate is constant and equal to H/h1 , and Π2 = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβa]/2βa,
where a = (1 − Rh1 /H). After
p some algebra,
0
2
Π (β) = [µ − (µ + 2λβa)/ µ2 + 4λβa]/2aβ 2 . Since the denominator is
negative, we only need to check p
that the denominator is negative as well.
2
0
2
Define z(β)
p = µ − (µ + 2λβa)/ µ + 4λβa. Then, z(0) = 0 and z (β) =
2
2
−[2λa/ µ + 4λβa(µ + 4λβa)](2λaβ) < 0 ∀β ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore the numerator is negative as well and Π0 (β) > 0.
Now we show that η 0 (β) > 0 ∀β < β1 . From definition η(β) = [1 +
f (β)]/[1−f (β)k], where f (β) = λ/(µ−β(Rh1 /H−1)Π2 )2 and k = h1 /H(R−
H/h1 ) > 0. Since Π0 (β) > 0 it is clear that f 0 (β) > 0 as well. Now,
η 0 (β) = [f 0 (β) + k]/(1 − f (β)k)2 . Since f 0 (β) > 0 and k > 0, we have that
η 0 (β) > 0 as we wanted to show.
Case β > β1
In this case the interest rate is a function of β as well. The first thing we
show is that ρ0 (β) > 0. For this,
p notice first that Π2 is now a function of two
variables, Π2 (β, ρ) = [−µ + µ2 + 4λβ(1 − R/(1 + ρ))]/2β(1 − R/(1 + ρ).
Its partial derivatives are ∂Π2 /∂ρ = [R/(1 + ρ)2 /[2β(1 − R/(1 + ρ))2 ]w(β, b)
and ∂Π2 /∂β = [1/2β 2 (1 − R/(1 + ρ))]w(β, b), where w(β, b) = µ − (µ2 +
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2λβb)/( µ2 + 4λβb) and b(ρ) = (1 − R/(1 + ρ)). Hence, we have that
b(H/h1 − 1) = a and w(β, a) = z(β). The same argument that shows that
z(β) < 0 extends to show w(β, b) < 0 since in equilibrium b < 0 and hence
∂Π2 /∂ρ < 0, ∂Π2 /∂β > 0.
Define F (β, ρ) = βΠ2 − h1 (1 + ρ).In equilibrium this is zero. Moreover,
Fρ = β∂Π2 /∂ρ − h1 < 0, and hence different from zero. Therefore, by the
Implicit Function Theorem, ρ is locally a well defined function of β and its
derivative is given by ρ0 (β) = −Fβ /Fρ . Since Fβ = Π2 + β∂Π2 /∂β > 0, it is
immediate that ρ0 (β) > 0.
Now we show that η 0 (β) < 0. Using the fact that h1 = βΠ2 (β, ρ)/(1 + ρ)
in equilibrium, it is true that η(β) = [1 + h(β)]/[1 − h(β)k(β)], where h(β) =
λ/(µ−(R−(1+ρ))h1 )2 and k(β) = (R/(1+ρ)−1). Since ρ0 (β) > 0, h0 (β) < 0
and k 0 (β) < 0. Let β1 < β2 . Then η(β1 ) = [1 + h(β1 )]/[1 − h(β1 )k(β1 )] >
[1 + h(β2 )]/[1 − h(β1 )k(β1 )] > [1 + h(β2 )]/[1 − h(β2 )k(β2 )] = η(β2 ).

Proof of (b)
This case follows immediately from the definition of λ1 and the proof above
in the case β < β1 .
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